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NOTE
Adverse to Reason: The Texas Supreme Court’s
Disconcerting Approach to Adverse Possession of Mineral
Leases in the Pool Case and Its Progeny
I. Introduction
In Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Pool,  the Texas Supreme Court1
issued a bewildering decision applying the doctrine of adverse possession to
severed oil and gas lease interests.  Relying on its adverse possession
jurisprudence, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the appellate court holdings
in favor of the lessors, withdrew a previous opinion in favor of the lessors, and
substituted a new opinion granting the lessees a fee simple determinable in the
mineral leases.2
This note explores the significance of the Pool ruling in the context of
Texas’ decisions that have applied the property doctrine of adverse possession
to claims for severed mineral rights.  Although this note focuses on Texas’
substantive and statutory law, jurisdictions where property owners commonly
sever mineral estates, such as Oklahoma, Louisiana, or Wyoming, should note
the overarching principles regarding the rights of lessors.  This note shows
how errors in interpreting and applying legal doctrines can disenfranchise
property owners; specifically, the note argues that the Pool court erred in three
respects.  First, the court improperly diverged from its previous rulings to
incorporate constructive repudiation into its jurisprudence regarding adverse
possession of mineral estates.  Second, the court failed to give adequate
consideration to the mutually beneficial and permissive nature of an oil and
gas lease.  Third, the note posits that the Texas Supreme Court’s
misapplication of the doctrine of adverse possession provides unscrupulous
lessees with a means of fraudulently disenfranchising lessors without fear of
judicial redress.
Part II outlines the doctrine of adverse possession and traces the Texas
Supreme Court’s development of the law as applied to mineral leases.  Part III
discusses the facts, issues, and holding of Pool, as well as the arguments made
by the dissent.  Part IV analyzes the methodologies used by the Texas Supreme
Court’s majority in reaching its decision in Pool and proposes alternative
applications of the law.  Part V analyzes the impact of the Pool ruling on later
Texas cases.  The note concludes with Part VI.
1. 124 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. 2003).  
2. Id. at 189-90.
817
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II. Adverse Possession Before Pool
Statutes of limitations have a long history in Anglo-American law,
extending back beyond the thirteenth century.   Every jurisdiction has statutes3
of limitations that fix the period of time in which a landowner must sue to
recover land from adverse occupiers.   While these statutes differ substantially4
in the duration of the established periods, in provisions for extending the
normally operative period, and other specific details, a large body of case law
complements the statutes by elaborating on the kind of possession that will
cause the statutory period to begin to run, and to continue running, against the
rightful property owner.5
This note addresses judicial application of the doctrine of adverse
possession to severed mineral estates.  While generally disfavored, adverse
possession gives hostile occupiers a means of acquiring title to property.   By6
adversely possessing an estate, the occupier creates an absolute title by deed
from the record owner via judicial proceeding.   Courts can apply the doctrine7
of adverse possession to a fee simple estate, a surface estate, and a severed
mineral estate.8
A. Severance of Mineral Estates
In general, an adverse occupant cannot possess a mineral estate until the
rightful owner has severed it from the greater estate.   The United States9
Supreme Court has held that a property owner may sever an interest in
subsurface minerals from ownership of the surface estate.   The owner of the10
estate can then transfer legal title of the mineral estate to different parties.  11
Once the property owner severs the mineral estate from the surface estate,
Texas law regards the mineral estate as wholly separate and distinct from the




6. See Francis v. Rogers, 2001 OK 111, ¶ 13, 40 P.3d 481, 486.
7. 3 AM. JUR. 2D Adverse Possession §§ 1, 248, 255 (2006).
8.  Id. § 1 (explaining that adverse possession often creates fee simple title to an estate);
id. §§ 278, 280, 289 (explaining how adverse possession of both surface and mineral estates can
occur).
9. See infra Part II.B.





surface estate.   The severance can pertain to a particular substance, mineral,12
subsurface depth, or geologic formation,  and an occupier can mature title to13
any of these estates via adverse possession.
B. Adverse Possession
The doctrine of adverse possession holds a unique status in common law. 
Generally, landowners may seek compensation for wrongful acts done to their
land by others.   Nevertheless, the doctrine of adverse possession limits a14
landowner’s rights.  Adverse possession allows an occupier to claim title to
another’s estate when the occupier uses that estate continuously, exclusively,
openly, notoriously, and hostilely for a statutory period of time.   The Texas15
legislature defines adverse possession as “an actual and visible appropriation
of real property, commenced and continued under a claim of right that is
inconsistent with and is hostile to the claim of another person.”   Thus, before16
an occupant can manifest the statutory requirements of adverse possession, he
or she must adversely possess the estate.
An occupier must satisfy a few requirements to adversely possess an estate. 
First, the occupier must give objective notice of an adverse claim to the
rightful property owner.   Once the occupant adversely possesses an estate,17
the rightful owner’s claim for ejectment commences.   Adverse occupation for18
a period longer than that prescribed by statute creates a new title to the
property in the occupant and terminates the rights of the prior owner.  19
Essentially, occupiers use adverse possession to forcibly transfer a property
interest.
A public policy argument justifies using the doctrine of adverse possession. 
Fundamentally, a failure to exploit mineral wealth creates economic injury to
the public.   The existence of economic markets for minerals proves that the20
public values the production and exploitation of minerals like oil, natural gas,
and coal.  By leaving the minerals in situ, the supply of scarce minerals
12. Harris v. Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302, 304-05 (Tex. 1943).
13. See 1 EUGENE KUNTZ, LAW OF OIL & GAS § 10.4 (1987).
14. 1 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 223 (2007).
15. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 59 (8th ed. 2004).
16. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.021(1) (Vernon 2006).
17. See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 3, § 91.04; see also Reitsma v. Pascoag Reservoir &
Dam, L.L.C., 774 A.2d 826, 832 (R.I. 2001) (stating statutory requirements that the occupant’s
possession be continuous, exclusive, open, notorious, and hostile are used as evidence to
support the occupier’s objective claim, and to show that the claim is not permissive). 
18. See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 3, § 91.02; see also Ontelaunee Orchards v. Rothermel,
11 A.2d 543, 545 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1940).
19. See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 3, § 91.10.
20. Id. § 91.01.
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available to consumers remains lower and the price of those minerals remains
higher.  Further, locating the owners and procuring consent to exploit mineral
estates can be more difficult as the severance grows older.  Thus, courts may
justifiably grant possession of the mineral estate to an occupant that puts the
estate to more publicly beneficial use when the rightful owner of the mineral
estate fails to exploit the mineral wealth.
C. Adverse Possession of a Severed Mineral Estate
Property owners hold severed mineral estates, like other estates, subject to
adverse possession.  In Texas, execution of an oil and gas lease severs the
mineral estate from the surface estate.   Where the property owner has severed21
the mineral estate from the surface estate, adverse possession of the surface
estate alone will not provide adverse title to the mineral estate.   The adverse22
party cannot possess the mineral estate solely by occupying the surface,
because doing so fails to establish a claim adverse to or inconsistent with
possession of the mineral estate.   Rather, the occupier must exploit the23
mineral estate to adversely possess that estate.24
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals announced the threshold for actual
possession of a severed mineral estate in Broughton v. Humble Oil & Refining
Co.: “[s]uch dominion must be exercised over the minerals as will be notice
to the owner of the mineral estate that the possessor of the surface is claiming
the minerals also.”   The Texas courts, however, have not defined “dominion”25
except to say that an occupier can only mature title to the mineral estate via
actual possession of the minerals.   When an adverse occupant begins26
exploratory drilling, the statute of limitations begins running subject to
21. See Rogers v. Ricane Enters., 772 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex. 1989).  In Oklahoma, once the
mineral estate has been severed, adverse possession of the surface estate does not mature to the
mineral estate because two estates of equal dignity cannot merge and must remain separate.  See
Ferguson v. Hillborn, 1965 OK 84, ¶ 27, 402 P.2d 914, 921.
22. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 14, § 224.1.  Often, owners of large tracts of land
sever the mineral estates and convey them to subsidiaries to protect themselves from adverse
possessors.  Id. (citing Houston Oil Co. of Tex. v. Moss, 284 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. 1955)).
23. See KUNTZ, supra note 13, § 10.4.  After severance, the mineral owner only retains a
protected interest in the mineral estate and easements appurtenant to that interest.  Thus, surface
occupation does not give rise to a cause of action against which a statute of limitations can run. 
The mineral owner, having no interest in the surface, takes no notice of surface conditions and
justifiably ignores them.  Id.
24. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 14, § 224.1.  
25. 105 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tex. App. 1937).
26. See Hunt Oil Co. v. Moore, 656 S.W.2d 634, 641 (Tex. App. 1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss4/5
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interruptions of the oil and gas operations.   Thus, in Texas, an occupier can27
adversely possess a mineral estate as soon as he begins drilling a well, and the
statute runs as long as the occupier has continuous, actual possession of the oil
and gas produced therefrom.   These elements of adverse possession provided28
the framework for the Texas Supreme Court’s ruling in Pool.
III. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Pool
A. Statement of the Case
In 1926, J.T. Sneed Jr. and his wife, Zella, granted an oil and gas lease to
Marland Oil Company to remain in force “for a term of ten years from this
date, and as long thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them, is produced from
said land by the lessee.”   Marland Oil subsequently assigned the lease to29
Texoma Natural Gas Company.   In 1936, J.T. Sneed, Jr. and Elizabeth Sneed30
Pool, individually as executors of the estate of Zella Sneed, executed a
separate gas lease to Texoma, to remain in force “so long as natural gas is
produced from any portion [of the land conveyed] under this contract . . . .”  31
In a separate agreement, the parties consolidated the 1926 and 1936 leases,32
and the operator drilled the J.T. Sneed #1 well on the consolidated acreage.  33
The well produced gas throughout the primary term, but suffered production
stoppages during its secondary term.34
Separately, in 1937, J.T. Sneed, Jr. and Elizabeth Sneed Pool granted a
natural gas lease to Texoma, to endure “pending the commencement and
continuation of drilling operations on said land . . . and as long thereafter as
natural gas is produced and marketed from any well on said land.”   The35
operator drilled two gas wells, the J.T. Sneed SN11 and the J.T. Sneed SN15,
which produced through the primary term, but these wells also did not produce
27. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 14, § 224.4 (citing Kilpatrick v. Gulf Prod. Co., 139
S.W.2d 653 (Tex. App. 1940)).
28. Id. (citing Counce v. Yount-Lee Oil Co., 87 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1937) (applying Texas
law)).
29. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Pool (Pool II), 30 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. App.
2000), rev’d, 124 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. 2003).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188, 190 (Tex. 2003).
33. Id.  The operator drilled a replacement well in 1994.  Id.
34. Pool II, 30 S.W.3d at 643.  The periods of nonproduction were August 1941, June
through September 1963, July through August 1964, June 1979, March 1983, July 1984, and
February through July 1997.  Id.
35. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Pool (Pool I), 30 S.W.3d 618, 624 (Tex. App.
2000), rev’d, 124 S.W.3d 188.
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during certain periods of the secondary term.   Notably, the record indicated36
that the lessees had stopped producing to benefit from expected higher winter
prices.37
In May 1998, the successors-in-interest to the lessors of the respective
Sneed Leases sued for decrees that the leases had terminated automatically
because the lessees had failed to produce, and the plaintiffs further sought
damages for conversion.   The successors-in-interest to the lessees denied the38
allegations and alternatively asserted affirmative defenses.   The lessees39
offered as their primary alternative defense that they had “obtained a fee
simple determinable in each of the mineral estates by adverse possession.”  40
In February 1999, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in both
suits, finding that the Sneed Leases had terminated as a matter of law when the
lessees stopped producing.   The cases subsequently went to jury trials on the41
issues of remedies and affirmative defenses.42
In the trial for the 1926 and 1936 leases, the jury found that the lessees had
at all times acted in good faith, despite the production stoppages.   Further, the43
jury found that the lessees had not acted fraudulently and excused any failure
to produce natural gas.   Nevertheless, the jury contradicted itself by finding44
that the leases had in fact expired and that the lessees had acquired the severed
mineral estates by adverse possession.   The trial judge, finding the evidence45
insufficient for the jury’s incongruous determinations, entered judgment for
the lessors notwithstanding the jury verdict.46
In the trial for the 1937 lease, the jury found that the lessees had acted in
bad faith in producing gas after production stoppages had automatically
36. Id.  The periods of nonproduction were August 1959, July through August 1960, June
through July 1961, June through October 1963, July through August 1964, and June 1969.  Id.
37. Pool, 124 S.W.3d at 203 (Jefferson, J., dissenting).  Favorable market conditions from
higher demand benefit the lessors as well as the lessees, as higher revenues driven by higher
prices will result in larger royalty payments.  Id.; see also infra Part IV.A.2.
38. Pool II, 30 S.W.3d at 643; Pool I, 30 S.W.3d at 624.
39. Pool II, 30 S.W.3d at 643; Pool I, 30 S.W.3d at 624.  Specifically, the lessees
contended that, “the leases did not terminate because there ha[d] been production in paying
quantities at all times, notwithstanding the periods of nonproduction, or that production was
restored within a reasonable period of time under the temporary cessation of production
doctrine.”  Pool, 124 S.W.3d at 191.
40. Pool, 124 S.W.3d at 191.
41. Pool II, 30 S.W.3d at 643; Pool I, 30 S.W.3d at 624.
42. Pool II, 30 S.W.3d at 643; Pool I, 30 S.W.3d at 624.






terminated the lease.   Moreover, while the lessees had not produced natural47
gas fraudulently, the jury would not excuse the temporary failure to produce
natural gas.   Further, although the lease had expired, the lessees had not48
acquired title to the severed mineral estate by adverse possession.   The trial49
court entered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict.   The total award50
after trial to the combined lessors was $5,902,937.92 plus fees, costs, and
prejudgment interest.   The appeals court upheld the rulings in favor of the51
plaintiffs.52
B. Issue
In Pool, the Texas Supreme Court considered whether the constructive
repudiation of a mineral estate tenancy initiated the statutory adverse
possession period.   The court of appeals had stated that the lessees could not53
establish adverse possession because they had not given actual notice of
repudiation of the lessors’ titles to the severed mineral estates.   Further, the54
tenant must objectively repudiate the tenancy to begin the adverse possession
process against the landlord.   Texas, a state that treats an oil and gas lease as55
a fee simple determinable estate that automatically terminates when production
stops, traditionally imposed upon a holdover lessee the requirement of
repudiating the former tenancy by actual notice before the adverse possession




51. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188, 191 (Tex. 2003).  The trial
court for the 1926 and 1936 leases, using stipulated damage calculations, awarded the lessors
$234,766.20 in actual damages to be paid by Natural Gas Pipeline Co. and MidCon Gas
Services, and $545,416.79 in actual damages to be paid by Chesapeake Panhandle Limited
Partnership, for a total award of $780,182.99 plus attorneys’ fees and costs.  Id.  The trial court
for the 1937 lease found the lessees jointly and severally liable for $1,522,754.93 in actual
damages, and found Natural Gas Pipeline Co., MidCon Gas, and Chesapeake Panhandle each
individually liable for $1,200,000 in exemplary damages, for a total award of $5,122,754.93
plus attorneys’ fees, costs, and prejudgment interest.  Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 194-97.
54. Id. at 192.  The lessees appealed the trial rulings to the Texas Court of Appeals, Seventh
District, in Amarillo.  The appeals court agreed with the separate trial rulings that the various
leases had terminated because production stopped in violation of the respective habendum
clauses.  Id.  The appeals court further found that laches was not an applicable defense, that the
lessors were not entitled to attorneys’ fees, that the lessors’ execution of division orders did not
revive the leases, that exemplary damages were not available because of the lack of evidence
of fraud, that statutes of limitations barred trespass and conversion claims, and finally that
damages should be reduced.  Id.
55. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 14, § 224.3.
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period could run.   On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court focused on the56
requirement of actual notice in its Pool ruling.
C. Holding
Justice Priscilla R. Owen, writing for a 6-1 majority of the Texas Supreme
Court, determined that the lessees had established adverse possession as a
matter of law.   Further, the court determined that the hostile lessees did not57
acquire a fee simple in the full mineral estate.   Instead, the lessees only58
gained “the same interest[s] that they adversely and peaceably possessed, that
is, the oil and gas leasehold estates as defined by the original leases.”   In59
conclusion, the Texas Supreme Court held that “the court of appeals erred in
failing to hold that the lessees in these two cases acquired fee simple
determinable mineral estates by adverse possession,” and accordingly reversed
the judgments by the courts of appeals and rendered judgments for the
lessees.60
D. Rationale of the Majority
The majority focused on Texas’ strict rules regarding transfer of a
determinable estate.  An oil and gas lease grants a fee simple determinable in
the severed mineral estate to the lessee.   Once the lease terminates, the lessee61
retains no interest in the mineral estate because it reverts in whole to the
lessor,  who can renegotiate for more favorable lease terms and a new signing62
bonus.  Where the lessor receives the reversion but the former lessee
nevertheless asserts a claim to the estate, the holdover lessee can only claim
a “permissive tenancy” and cannot begin to adversely possess the severed
mineral claim until giving the lessor notice of repudiation.   Whether63
constructive repudiation of a permissive tenancy could initiate the adverse
possession of a mineral estate was unclear until the Pool case.
In Pool, the Texas Supreme Court diverged from established adverse
possession law.  Traditionally, a permissive tenant must clearly repudiate the
56. Id. § 224.4 (citing Anadarko Petroleum Co. v. Thompson, 60 S.W.3d. 134 (Tex. App.
2000), rev’d, 94 S.W.3d 500 (Tex. 2002); Pool II, 30 S.W.3d 639, 646 (Tex. App. 2000), rev’d,
124 S.W.3d 188; Pool I, 30 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. App. 2000), rev’d, 124 S.W.3d 188).
57. Pool, 124 S.W.3d at 192.
58. Id. at 199.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 202.
61. Id. at 199.
62. Id. at 194.
63. Id. (citing Tex-Wis Co. v. Johnson, 534 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Tex. 1976)); see also 49 AM.
JUR. 2D Landlord & Tenant § 353 (2006).
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tenancy to begin the adverse possession process against the landlord.  64
Nevertheless, the Pool majority refused to require actual notice of repudiation
to terminate a permissive tenancy where the permissive tenant gives
constructive notice of repudiation.   Further, the majority announced that it65
will presume constructive notice of repudiation where the facts indicate a long-
continued use of the land,  and where the facts show that the adverse occupant66
has made a long-continued, open, notorious, and exclusive claim of title to the
mineral estate that is inconsistent with the existence of title in the lessor.  67
Consequently, an oil and gas lessee provides constructive notice of repudiation
to the lessor where it continues to physically remove and dispose of the
valuable, nonrenewable minerals for its own account.   The majority held that68
by producing natural gas once the leases had expired and the mineral estates
had reverted to the lessors in their entirety, the lessees acted in a manner
hostile to the lessors’ ownership of all the minerals in place.   Thus, the69
majority’s statement of law failed to take into account the permissive nature
of an oil and gas lease and the inability of a lessor to meticulously account for
a lessee’s activities.
Applying the facts of Pool, the majority reasoned that once the lessees
actually stopped producing, the leases automatically terminated and reverted
to the lessors.   Thereafter, the former lessees no longer held a right to70
produce and market any minerals.   Further, the holdover lessees’ refusal to71
pay the full amount of the proceeds that they owed to the lessors constituted
constructive notice of repudiation of the former lessors’ fee simple in the
severed mineral estate.   The fact that the holdover lessees paid a one-eighth72
royalty for minerals produced and marketed did not negate the constructive
notice of repudiation because the lessees should have paid the lessors for all
of the production—essentially an eight-eighths royalty.   73
Thus, rather than find that the acceptance of royalty payments by the lessors
constituted either constructive or actual permission to the holdover lessees to
continue to explore, produce, and market minerals, the Texas Supreme Court
considered the royalty payments proof that the holdover lessees acted hostile
64. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 14, § 224.3.
65. Pool, 124 S.W.3d at 194.
66. Id. (citing Tex-Wis Co., 534 S.W.2d at 899).
67. Id. (citing Vasquez v. Meaders, 291 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Tex. 1956)).
68. Id. at 196.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 194.
71. See id. at 197.
72. Id.  The accounting called for all proceeds minus the costs of extraction.  Id.
73. Id.
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to the lessors’ exclusive rights to explore for and produce minerals.   The74
majority opinion fails to account for the fact that a lessor and lessee enter into
an oil and gas lease for the mutual benefit of both parties, whereby the lessor
permits the exploration for and production of minerals.  In Pool, the Texas
Supreme Court established an unprecedented lessee-friendly approach to
adverse possession.
E. Jefferson’s Dissent
Justice Wallace B. Jefferson’s dissent criticized the majority for refusing to
address whether, in fact, the leases terminated due to production stoppages.  75
Failing to do so, the dissent argued, “puts the cart before the horse.”   When,76
as in these cases, the underlying oil and gas lease does not include a savings
clause to avoid automatic termination, Justice Jefferson would prefer that the
Texas Supreme Court hold that periods of nonproduction during the secondary
term of the lease should not necessarily terminate the lease.   Had the majority77
found that the “temporary cessation-of-production doctrine” precluded lease
termination, then adverse possession would not have been an issue.78
The Texas Supreme Court’s refusal to apply the temporary cessation-of-
production doctrine forced the majority to use adverse possession to maintain
the leases.  Justice Jefferson felt that the majority also failed in its application
of adverse possession.   According to the dissent, the majority’s definition of79
constructive notice of repudiation creates a harsh rule for any lessor,
particularly where many parties own small fractions of a royalty interest.  80
Justice Jefferson’s dissent alluded to, but did not cover in depth, the true
problems with the majority’s application of the doctrine of adverse possession.
IV. Analysis
Because Texas has not adopted the temporary cessation-of-production
doctrine to preserve oil and gas leases where the operator stops producing to
benefit from expected higher prices,  the Pool majority had to abuse the81
doctrine of adverse possession to reach its desired conclusion.  After
74. Id.
75. Id. at 202 (Jefferson, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 203 (citing Watson v. Rochmill, 155 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. 1941)).
78. For a discussion of the temporary cessation-of-production doctrine, see infra Part IV.A.
79. Pool, 124 S.W.3d at 202 (Jefferson, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s resolution of the case
introduces a new twist on adverse possession that, at least on its face, divests a prior owner of
property without the sort of notorious ouster we have previously mandated.”).
80. Id. at 203.
81. Id. at 205.
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discussing the merit of applying temporary cessation-of-production doctrine,
this note argues two points.  First, the majority opinion obviated the need for
the adverse possessor to actually repudiate the record owner’s title to the
severed mineral estate before adverse possession begins.   Second, the82
majority opinion discarded the requirement that the hostile occupier possess
the estate adverse to or inconsistent with a claim of right.   By disavowing83
actual repudiation and ignoring the requirement that an occupant must make
a claim that is adverse to a claim of right, the Texas Supreme Court enabled
the disenfranchisement of lessors by deceitful lessees.
A. Rationale for Adopting “Temporary Cessation-of-Production Doctrine”
Oil and gas wells, by their nature, do not produce constantly.  Inevitably,
production will stop due to mechanical breakdowns, reworking problems, or,
as in Pool, market conditions.   The temporary cessation-of-production84
doctrine addresses the premise that the lessor and lessee must have
contemplated that production stoppages would occasionally occur.   As a85
result, the parties must have contemplated the inevitability of these short
delays and deemed them excusable.   Thus, courts should uphold a lease86
where a reasonable and prudent operator would temporarily stop producing.  87
The legal flexibility of the temporary cessation-of-production doctrine lets
courts craft solutions that reflect both the mutual benefits sought by the parties
and the permissive nature of mineral exploration and production.
1. Discrediting the Texas Rule
In Texas and elsewhere, courts refuse to cancel leases when brief production
stoppages would benefit the lessors as well as the lessees.   Texas courts,88
however, only allow production stoppages where the lessee can show either
82. Id. at 202.
83. Id. at 209. 
84. Id. at 203. 
85. Bryan v. Big Two Mile Gas Co., 577 S.E.2d 258, 265-66 (W. Va. 2001).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Reynolds v. McNeill, 236 S.W.2d 723 (Ark. 1951) (stoppage allowed after
the breakdown of production equipment); Fuqua v. Chester Oil Co., 246 S.W.2d 1007 (Ky.
1952) (stoppage allowed for change to secondary recovery methods); Frost v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
119 So. 2d 759 (Miss. 1960) (stoppage allowed for reworking); Feland v. Placid Oil Co., 171
N.W.2d 829 (N.D. 1969) (stoppage allowed due to the lack of saltwater disposal facilities);
Durkee v. Hazan, 1968 OK 96, 452 P.2d 803 (stoppage allowed to drill the well deeper);
Midwest Oil Corp. v. Winsauer, 323 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. 1959) (stoppage allowed to remove a
pipe obstruction).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
828 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  60:817
a sudden stoppage of the well or a mechanical breakdown.   Moreover, Texas89
courts have explicitly refused to apply temporary cessation-of-production
doctrine where the operator briefly stopped producing due to financial
difficulties.   Doing so, however, fails to acknowledge that situations arise90
that call for the lessee to temporarily stop producing until mineral markets
improve.  In Pool, the lessees stopped producing to benefit from expected
higher winter prices.   Higher prices benefit both the lessor and the lessee. 91
Accordingly, the Texas Supreme Court could have applied the temporary
cessation-of-production doctrine to preserve the leases for a production
stoppage that would benefit both parties.
The Texas Supreme Court’s refusal to extend the temporary cessation-of-
production doctrine to stoppages for marketing natural gas runs counter to the
rights and duties implied in an oil and gas lease.  Both Texas and Oklahoma
courts recognize that lessees assume an implied covenant to market
production.   As a practical matter, a lessee who has otherwise acted in good92
faith and with reasonable planning may still encounter difficulties when
marketing its natural gas production.  While an oil producer can easily store
and sell its production, a natural gas producer must immediately prepare the
gas for transportation in pipelines.   Moreover, while oil producers often pay93
royalties by transferring produced oil to the royalty owner, which allows
lessors to make independent arrangements for sale, gas producers usually pay
royalties in terms of a percentage of the sale price or market value.   Thus, the94
lessor of a natural gas lease must depend on the lessee’s marketing efforts to
maximize its royalty value.
89. See Cobb v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 897 F.2d 1307, 1309-10 (5th Cir. 1990)
(applying Texas law); Bradley v. Avery, 746 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. App. 1988).  
90. See Watson v. Rochmill, 155 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. 1941); Fick v. Wilson, 349 S.W.2d
622 (Tex. App. 1961).  
91. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188, 203 (Tex. 2003) (Jefferson,
J., dissenting).  
92. See, e.g., Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 300 F. Supp. 119, 125 (W.D. Okla. 1969)
(applying Oklahoma law), rev’d on other grounds, 435 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1971); Amoco Prod.
Co. v. First Baptist Church of Pyote, 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. App. 1979), writ refused n.r.e., 611
S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980).  The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma
specifically stated that “[the] lessee . . . has an implied duty and obligation in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, as a prudent operator, with due regard for the interest of both lessor and
lessee, to obtain a market for the gas produced . . . at the prevailing market price.”  Craig, 300
F. Supp. at 125.
93. See Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 175-76 (La. 1992).
94. See Curry v. Tex. Co., 8 S.W.2d 206, 210 (Tex. App. 1928).
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2. Endorsing the Oklahoma Rule
While the Texas Supreme Court refused to bend its rules to acknowledge
the mutual benefits derived from marketing natural gas, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court assisted lessors and lessees in a slightly different context in
Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals.   In Pack, the court held that temporarily shutting95
in a natural gas well for marketing reasons did not terminate a lease.   The96
court rejected the notion that such a production stoppage should terminate a
lease because Oklahoma statutory law indicates a strong policy against
forfeiture of estates.   Rather, the court held that whether a production97
stoppage terminates a lease depends on the facts of each case and the
“compelling equitable circumstances.”   Finally, the Oklahoma Supreme98
Court held that temporary production stoppages for marketing benefits could
not ipso facto deprive the parties of their mutually beneficial lease.   99
The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s view indicates that the lessee fulfills its
primary duty to the lessor when it discovers oil, gas, or other minerals.  The
lessee must thereafter proceed with exploration and production subject to an
implied covenant to market the extracted minerals within a reasonable time
and at a reasonable price.  The maintenance of a lease despite temporary
production stoppages better suits the goals of the lessor and lessee because a
prudent operator, having taken the risks of drilling successfully, will seek to
maximize its profit by marketing its production.   The lessee’s actions to100
maximize the price received for production benefit the lessor by resulting in
higher royalty payments. 
 In Pool, the lessees temporarily stopped producing in order to benefit by
later selling production at predicted higher prices.   The Oklahoma courts101
would permit the stoppage if the facts indicated that the stoppage was
reasonable.  Maintaining the leases in such a situation fulfills two goals.  First,
by maintaining the leases the Texas Supreme Court would have facilitated and
endorsed the Pool lessees’ execution of their implied duty to market natural
gas production.  Second, by maintaining the leases the court would have
95. 1994 OK 23, 869 P.2d 323.   
96. Id. ¶ 31, 869 P.2d at 331.  
97. Id. ¶ 9, 869 P.2d at 326-27 (citing 23 OKLA. STAT. § 2 (1971); Stewart v. Amerada Hess
Corp., 1979 OK 145, ¶ 10, 604 P.2d 854, 858).  
98. Id. (quoting Stewart, ¶ 10, 604 P.2d at 858).  
99. See id.  
100. See Bristol v. Colo. Oil & Gas Corp., 225 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1955) (holding that under
Oklahoma law, an eight-year production delay for marketing was reasonable due to the
production of impure gas and the lack of an available pipeline).  
101. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188, 203 (Tex. 2003) (Jefferson,
J., dissenting).
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enabled the lessees to maximize the price they received for production, leading
to higher revenues for the lessees and higher royalty payments for the lessors. 
Nevertheless, the Texas Supreme Court held that the production stoppages
cancelled the Pool leases.  The Pool ruling paradoxically imposes upon lessees
an implied duty to market the produced natural gas, yet denies them the ability
to maximize revenues by waiting for favorable natural gas prices.  The Texas
Supreme Court’s refusal to extend the temporary cessation-of-production
doctrine to marketing stoppages not only leads to an absurd contradiction with
the implied duty to market, but also harms both the lessors and lessees by
denying them the ability to maximize their mutual lease benefits.
B. Repudiating Constructive Repudiation
Rather than apply the temporary cessation-of-production doctrine, the Texas
Supreme Court found that the lessees had constructively repudiated their
holdover tenancies and adversely possessed the leases.  The majority, however,
defined constructive notice of repudiation in a manner that contradicts the
intentions of the contracting parties.  Normally, adverse possession of a
severed mineral estate cannot begin until the lessor receives actual notice of
repudiation from the lessee.   Nevertheless, the Pool majority held that the102
notice of repudiation may be inferred or constructive rather than actual.   The103
Texas Supreme Court’s circular logic means that although a hostile occupier
manifesting the statutory adverse possession factors cannot claim the severed
mineral estate until it gives notice of repudiation to the lessor, the Texas
Supreme Court is willing to infer notice where the hostile claimant has already
manifested the statutory adverse possession factors.  The majority’s promotion
of ex post facto analysis lowers the burden on the adverse occupant by
eliminating the requirement that the occupant’s claim be objectively adverse
to the claim of the rightful owner.
The common interpretation of oil and gas leases precludes adoption of the
constructive repudiation of title.  Where a hostile party produces and markets
minerals while claiming a lease from the mineral owner, that party cannot
claim adverse possession.   The assertion that long-continued use supports104
102. Id. at 194 (majority opinion) (citing Tex-Wis Co. v. Johnson, 534 S.W.2d 895, 899
(Tex. 1976)).
103. Id.  Texas substantive law permits a jury to “‘infer notice of repudiation without any
change in the use of the land,’ if there has been ‘long-continued use.’”  Id. (quoting Johnson,
534 S.W.2d at 899).  The Texas Supreme Court held that “constructive notice will be presumed
where the facts show . . . that the adverse occupancy and claim of title to the land involved in
this suit has been long continued, open, notorious, exclusive and inconsistent with the existence
of title in the respondent.”  Id. (quoting Vasquez v. Meaders, 291 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Tex. 1956)).
104. See KUNTZ, supra note 13, § 10.5.
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sufficient notice of repudiation creates the possibility that a lessee may assert
a hostile claim, even though both the lessor and the lessee have proceeded for
several decades in accordance with the original lease.   Under a traditional105
adverse possession analysis, the lessee in that scenario could not make a
hostile claim.  In the Pool cases, the lessees paid royalties and otherwise
seemed to abide by the terms of the original leases.   Thus, the Texas106
Supreme Court now holds that a holdover lessee need not take any overt steps
to assert an adverse claim.  Rather, the Texas Supreme Court will consider any
operations under an oil and gas lease sufficient to create an adverse
environment.  The Pool majority’s interpretation refutes the Texas Supreme
Court’s previous finding that, “[t]he primary object of an oil and gas lease is
to ‘secure development of the property for the mutual benefit of the
parties.’”   107
C. Discarding Adversity to a Claim of Right
The Texas Supreme Court manipulated notice of repudiation in a way that
failed to give adequate consideration to the fact that the lessee holds a
necessarily permissive claim to the mineral estate that it obtained via
consideration.  In an oil and gas lease, the lessor and lessee share a common
goal of “mutual benefit.”  The lessee wins its benefit in the form of profits
obtained by producing and marketing the mineral estate.  For the lessor, the
benefit comes in the form of royalty profits generated by exploiting the
mineral estate.  Contrary to the traditional notion of “mutual benefit,” the
majority specifically stated: 
[A]n oil and gas lease contemplates that the mineral estate itself
may be permanently and irrevocably depleted by removing and
exhausting the minerals.  An oil and gas lessee that holds over
continues to physically remove and dispose of the very valuable,
non-renewable minerals for its own account.  Such actions are by
their nature hostile to the lessor’s ownership of all the minerals in
place once the lease expires and the mineral estate reverts to the
lessor in its entirety.108
Rather than embrace the mutual nature of the oil and gas agreement, the
majority characterized the relationship as necessarily hostile.
105. Pool, 124 S.W.3d at 202 (Jefferson, J., dissenting).
106. See id. at 197 (majority opinion).
107. Id. at 203 (Jefferson, J., dissenting) (quoting Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex.
1942)).
108. Id. at 195-96 (majority opinion).
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Contrary to the ruling of the Texas Supreme Court, where both parties
continue to believe that they have a functioning contract, the lessee can only
exploit the mineral estate with the lessor’s permission.  In Pool, the majority
quickly dismissed the fact that the holdover lessees continued to pay a royalty
to the lessors.   That fact, however, highlights the permissive nature of the109
lessees’ rights.  By executing an oil and gas lease, the lessor grants the lessee
certain rights for the mutual, agreed-upon benefit of the two parties.  The
nature of those rights precludes the lessee from acting as if the contract is valid
while simultaneously making a hostile claim against the rightful owner of the
mineral estate.  
The majority’s ruling leaves open an opportunity for a lessee to fraudulently
conceal the termination of an oil and gas lease, and then continue to act as
though the lease is still in effect without fear of legal repercussion.  Often, the
lessor of a fractional mineral interest resides far from the routine operations of
the party called upon to exploit the mineral estate for the parties’ mutual
benefit.  Under the law stated in Pool, whenever that distant lessor errs in its
oversight, the lessee can safely assume that by acting as though the lease is still
in effect, the lessee will maintain the lease despite its duties to the lessor under
contract.  Maintenance of the lease thereafter harms the rightful property
owner by precluding him from renegotiating for better lease terms and a new
lease bonus.  Moreover, after Pool, the Texas Supreme Court will grant the
lessee a new lease by adverse possession.
The majority, in dismissing as immaterial the fact that the “adverse” lessees
paid royalties, discarded the requirement that hostile possession be adverse to
or inconsistent with a claim of right.  When a lessor accepts a royalty payment
it accepts the primary consideration paid by the lessee in return for the right
to explore and produce the mineral estate.  In other words, the lessor’s
acceptance of the royalty payment demonstrates an existing lease.  In Pool, the
lessees resumed production after brief stoppages, drilled a replacement well,
erected signs on the property, and paid ad valorem taxes.   From a lessor’s110
perspective, the lessees exercised rights consistent with the rights they enjoyed
under the leases.  Rather than indicate hostility to the lessors’ claims of right,
the lessees acted as though the leases were still in effect and exploited the
mineral estate with permission from the lessors.   The findings that the111
majority used to prove constructive notice of repudiation were as follows: first,
the lessees remained on the property for the statutory period of time; second,
the lessors did not demand the full eight-eighths payment of royalties, only the





portion designated by the leases; and third, the lessees continued to deplete the
mineral resources of the property.   The Texas Supreme Court’s findings do112
not indicate hostility by the lessees.  Instead, the findings indicate that the
lessors extended permission to the lessees to holdover the tenancies to the
mineral estates.  By misinterpreting these facts, the Pool majority set the stage
for the disenfranchisement of lessors.
V. Impact
The Texas Supreme Court insisted in Pool that constructive repudiation of
a holdover tenancy commences the running of the statute of limitations on an
adverse possession claim.  As a result, courts applying Texas law have focused
strictly on the economic benefits accrued to lessees without giving proper
weight to the equitable desires of the lessors.  Subsequent decisions by both
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas and the
Texas Court of Appeals have entrenched the rule that, in Texas, a lessee need
not actually repudiate the tenancy to adversely mature title to a mineral lease.
A. Pace v. Chesapeake Panhandle Ltd. Partnership
In Pace v. Chesapeake Panhandle Ltd. Partnership, an operator completed
the Jester T-1 well in 1931 as a commercial natural gas producer within the
primary terms of each of its controlling leases.   After receiving assignment113
of the lease in 1992, MidCon Gas Services Corp. conveyed all its right, title,
and interest in the leases to a company that would eventually be named
Chesapeake Panhandle Limited Partnership.   Chesapeake and its pre-114
decessors in title had paid all the applicable taxes on the mineral estate since
at least 1978, and exclusively produced natural gas from the subject property
since 1941.   From 1941 and continuously thereafter, Chesapeake visibly115
possessed the subject property at all times, and Chesapeake and its
predecessors in title provided the plaintiffs and their predecessors an
accounting of all gas produced on a monthly basis as a one-eighth royalty,
keeping the remaining seven-eighths proceeds for themselves.   116
After the lessees claimed title by adverse possession, the lessors sued on the
notion that “newly discovered evidence of an intentional effort on the part of
the lessees to conceal periods of non-production from the lessors” preempted
112. Id. at 203 (Jefferson, J., dissenting).
113. Pace v. Chesapeake Panhandle Ltd. P’ship, No. Civ. A. 2:99-CV-0327-J, 2004 WL




Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
834 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  60:817
the lessees’ claim that it could adversely possess the subject well.   The117
Texas appellate courts have long held that statutes of limitation for adverse
possession subject to fraud cannot run until the victim discovers, or should
have discovered, the fraud.   Nonetheless, the court bypassed any discussion118
of fraud and proceeded immediately to the factors that supported a finding of
adverse possession of the mineral leases.   Based on Pool, the court declined119
to determine whether production stoppages terminated the leases.   Instead,120
the court summarily concluded that production intermittently stopped, that the
leases did terminate, and that the lessees nevertheless had acquired the leases
in fee simple determinable by adverse possession.   Finally, the court121
dismissed the fraud claims because, pursuant to Pool, constructive repudiation
of the leases commenced claims for adverse possession.   122
The Pool and Pace rulings set a disturbing precedent.  Where a holdover
producer continues to exploit the mineral estate, the producer may fool the
lessor into believing that it continues to honor the lease.  Conceivably, a
holdover lessee can knowingly conceal its termination of the lease.  Thereafter,
so long as the lessee reestablishes production, the lessee’s knowing
concealment of the lease termination does not amount to misrepresentation that
would constitute a fraud. 
B. Glover v. Union Pacific Railroad
The Texas Court of Appeals adopted the Pool majority’s rationale for
constructive repudiation in Glover v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., wherein
many parties owned small fractions of a royalty interest.   In Glover, a123
lessor’s heirs claimed the decedent’s mineral estate by inheritance.   The124
117. Id. at *2.
118. See, e.g., Glenn v. Steele, 61 S.W.2d 810, 810 (Tex. 1933); Carruth Mortgage Corp.
v. Ford, 630 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Tex. App. 1982); Cartwright v. Minton, 318 S.W.2d 449, 454
(Tex. App. 1958).  The standard for discovery of fraud is the exercise of diligence as would be
done by a person of ordinary care and prudence.  See, e.g., Glenn, 61 S.W.2d at 810;
Cartwright, 318 S.W.2d at 454.
119. Pace, 2004 WL 1194453, at *2.
120. Id.
121. Id.  Because it declined to analyze the plaintiffs’ fraud claim, the court proceeded
immediately to the fulfillment of the ten year statute of limitations provided by the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code.  Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.026(a)
(Vernon 2006)).
122. Id.
123. Glover v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 187 S.W.3d 201, 215 (Tex. App. 2006).
124. Id. at 206-07.  The decedent’s title arose via a 1904 deed that conveyed land next to a
railroad right-of-way, although the deed did not actually describe the strip within the right-of-
way where the minerals were found.  Id.
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cotenant possessors had operated wells on the strip for approximately seventy
years.   The lessor’s heirs argued that they alone owned the mineral estate125
through the initial grant and that the lessees could not adversely possess the
mineral estate because they had not sufficiently repudiated the cotenancy to
allow the statute of limitations to run.   The Texas Court of Appeals held126
that, pursuant to Pool, the producers had provided constructive notice of
repudiation of the cotenancy by their long-continued and open mineral
production.127
The Glover case demonstrates the practical difficulties inherent in Texas’
new constructive repudiation jurisprudence.  Often, lessors split their mineral
interests among many heirs, some of whom live far from the drilling
operations.  While a fractional lessor may know that a lessee has erected
drilling equipment and engages in mineral production, the lessor likely cannot
discern whether the lessee’s claim is hostile or permissive.  Further, so long as
the producer pays the royalty denominated in the original lease, the derivative
lessor has no reason to think that the holdover lessee has established an
adverse claim to the lease or to the mineral estate.  
As Pace and Glover illustrate, the Pool ruling established a precedent
whereby a lessee can conceal a production stoppage that would otherwise
terminate the lease.  Rather than let the mineral estate revert to the original
lessor, who might renegotiate for a new bonus and more favorable royalty
terms, the Texas Supreme Court will grant the holdover lessee a new lease by
adverse possession.  If the holdover lessee merely re-engages in exploiting the
mineral estate, then the occupier need not apprise the rightful owner that the
lease has terminated and therefore the mineral estate has reverted.  Instead,
Texas courts hold that continued possession of the estate by the lessee
repudiates the rightful owner’s claim to the mineral estate, even though many
lessors never have reason to know that the lessee let the lease terminate by
failing to produce.
VI. Conclusion
The Texas Supreme Court’s errors in interpreting and applying legal
doctrine deprive property owners of their rights.  Because the Texas courts
consider constructive repudiation the base requirement for asserting a claim of
adverse possession, producers may rob property owners of the full value of
their mineral estates by purposeful misrepresentations.  After years of
decisions that diluted the lessors’ ownership rights in favor of the oil and gas
125. Id. at 207 n.2.
126. Id. at 207.
127. Id. at 213-16.
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industry, the Texas courts have allowed the exception to swallow the statutory
rule.  The Texas Supreme Court introduced a new view of adverse possession
that divests the rightful property owners of their mineral estate without as
much as a notice of the expulsion.   Without actual notice of adversity or128
termination, the rightful property owner has no reason to know that a producer
can claim the adverse possession of a new lease.129
Despite the public benefits from mineral exploitation, courts should not let
a producer purposely conceal the termination of a lease to withhold a mineral
estate from its rightful owner.  Demanding actual repudiation as a prerequisite
to adverse possession of a mineral estate does not place a substantial
impediment on exploitation of a mineral estate.  Rather, it merely forces a
producer to either abide by the terms of its lease, or to deal openly and
honestly with the lessor.  As long as the Texas courts continue to support
constructive repudiation of a mineral lease, they will endorse opaque dealings
that harm property owners.  To remedy this, either the Texas Supreme Court
should overrule its support of constructive repudiation in Pool, or the Texas
legislature should take steps to protect mineral owners from
disenfranchisement.
Ivan Laurence London
128. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188, 202 (Tex. 2003) (Jefferson,
J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 203.
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